Towards pragmatic and functional unit of mind-and-brain
in RESPONSE TO Danko georgiev’s “a linkage of mind and brain: sir john eccles and modern dualistic interactionism”
Rayito Rivera-Hernández1,2 and Drozdstoj Stoyanov1
1Department of Psychiatry and Medical Psychology, Medical University, Plovdiv, Bulgaria, 2Department of Psychobiology, University of Salamanca, Spain
Consciousness is an enigma, perhaps the greatest enigma of philosophy of science. It can be described as a multilevel phenomenon, where transition (from unconsciousness to consciousness) is not a compromise OFF / ON in neuronal activity, but involves a complex change in nerve function, which is mediated by the environment (1). For the analysis of consciousness, the Australian philosopher David J. Chalmers distinguishes the easy problem of the hard problem of consciousness. The easy problem to analyze issues such as discrimination between sensory stimuli, the integration of information to guide behavior, verbalization of internal states, the integration of sensory information with past experience, how to focus attention, and what distinguishes waking from sleep. On the other hand, the “hard problem” of consciousness is to explain how the physical brain gives rise to consciousness. This analysis deals with the latter.
Biomed Rev 2011; 22: 85-89.
Received 25 December 2011, revised 27 December 2011, accepted 28 December 2011.
Correspondence: Drozdstoj Stoyanov, MD, PhD, Medical University, BG-4000 Plovdiv, Bulgaria.